Graphika

(Don’t) Look at This Photograph

Examining the Tactics AI Nudifier and Undressing Services Use for Promotion and Revenue Generation

Matthew Patane

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By Matthew Patane

Overview

Companies and services that provide synthetic, AI-generated nonconsensual intimate imagery (NCII), also known as AI nudifier or AI undressing services, continue to proliferate, expand, and adapt. For several years, Graphika, Indicator, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Bellingcat, other research organizations, and news outlets have reported extensively on the AI nudifier industry, highlighting its pervasiveness. At the heart of this industry is a profit-driven motivation that perpetuates harm and harassment against individuals – primarily women and girls – who have not consented to their likenesses being used for sexual purposes.

This report builds on and complements prior research by examining the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) NCII services use that Graphika documented through our intelligence monitoring between August 2025 and March 2026. It is based on open-source research and investigative techniques, including targeted search engine queries, domain and source code analysis, and ad transparency tools. It highlights how NCII services remain tenacious and adaptive despite government regulation, public scrutiny, and social media platform moderation.

Throughout, we refer to NCII services as AI nudifier or AI undressing services, websites, or apps. These phrases refer to the same practice: online services that enable customers to upload images and create and disseminate AI-generated NCII of individuals. This imagery, which includes videos, typically depicts the individuals as nude, removing their clothes, or performing sexual acts.

We also refer to AI companion (e.g., AI girlfriend/boyfriend) and AI adult entertainment services, which we consider to be different from NCII services. AI companion and adult entertainment services may offer users the ability to create synthetic sexually explicit content, but they do not necessarily utilize images of real people. We only defined a service as an NCII service if we assessed with high confidence that it provided synthetic NCII generation options or explicitly advertised itself as such. We did not test any of the services discussed in this report.

Key Findings

- NCII providers or actors affiliated with them regularly use accounts on multiple mainstream social media platforms, as well as coordinated networks of inauthentic accounts, to run ads or promote their websites. For example, since April 2025, a network of about 45,000 very likely automated or inauthentic accounts on X has continually promoted a prominent AI nudifier service using variations of similar text.
- NCII providers have changed the style of the ads they run on social media platforms in an attempt to avoid moderation and takedowns. Instead of using terminology that explicitly states that the ad is for an AI nudifier or undressing service, ads we observed commonly used more implicit phrasing alongside censored visuals.
- Actors likely serving as affiliate marketers for NCII services, meaning they can earn a share of revenue for referrals, have utilized various means to promote these providers. These include generating publicly viewable chats on an AI platform that feature keyword-stuffed articles designed to rank highly on search engines or injecting similar articles as PDFs onto government and university websites.
- Other actors have promoted NCII services by directing users to promotional codes on online coupon platforms or publishing tutorials about how to download modified mobile apps on iOS and Android devices.

Monetizing 'Desires'

NCII services make money, in part, by charging users to produce undressed or nudified images or videos based on uploaded images. Many keep their tools behind paywalls or plans, requiring users to purchase coins, tokens, "gems," or "desires" to generate content or access expanded services and image options.



One NCII service sells packages of "desires" that customers can use to generate images.



An example of an NCII service selling "gems" that customers can use to generate images (top). The service claims to accept various payment methods (bottom).

In addition, a key component of how AI undressing and nudifier services promote themselves is through affiliate marketing programs that allow others to "become a partner" and earn a share of the service's revenue through referral links that promote and direct to the service. One prominent NCII service that we, Indicator, and others have tracked claims that its affiliate marketing program has generated $2.6 million in affiliate profits. We could not verify this claim based on open-source information.





Webpages promoting the affiliate marketing programs of two NCII services.

Coordinated and Cross-Platform Accounts

As Graphika has previously noted, NCII services leverage several of the same marketing and monetization tactics as legitimate e-commerce companies, including creating accounts and running ads on mainstream social media platforms. While several platforms have taken steps and created policies to remove NCII and curb the ability of these services to exploit their sites, we identified accounts and content across Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, Reddit, SoundCloud, Telegram, TikTok, X, YouTube, and other platforms that promoted or ran ads for NCII websites.

A common tactic we observed was the creation or use of networks of coordinated accounts to promote NCII services, including on Facebook and X.

Facebook

Between August 2025 and March 2026, we identified four distinct networks of Facebook pages that ran ads for different NCII services on Meta platforms. While the networks varied in size and had some operational differences, they typically used similar techniques, including:

- **Running ads for multiple domains that direct to the same service:** NCII operators regularly administer multiple domains, including redirection websites that may obfuscate their intent and then send users to the real service. The ads we observed regularly listed domains that appeared benign or gave no explicit indication that they were for an NCII service. Clicking on these ads often led to one of several websites for an NCII service, or an intermediary page that then redirected to the service.
    - For example, we identified 20 Facebook pages that ran ads for 10 domains with slightly different spellings that went to websites with identical formats, including GIFs of Megan Fox and Sydney Sweeney removing their clothes.
    - In some cases, the source code for these domains indicated they were intended to be "cloaked," or hidden, from automated systems. By including certain instructions in source code, domain operators can present search engine crawlers or other automated systems that check domains with a website that appears benign while directing human users to the real or malicious domain.

```
<!-- Favicon and Icons -->
<link rel="icon" href="/[redacted] logo.svg" type="image/svg+xml" />
<link rel="alternate icon" href="/[redacted] logo.svg" />
<link rel="apple-touch-icon" href="/[redacted] logo.svg" />

<!-- Viewport and Theme -->
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0, viewport-fit=cover" />
<meta name="theme-color" content="#000000" />

<!-- SEO Blocking - Cloaking site should not be indexed -->
<meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow" />
<meta name="googlebot" content="noindex, nofollow" />
<meta name="bingbot" content="noindex, nofollow" />
```

Several ads we observed running on Facebook linked to domains with slightly different spellings of the same word. The websites at these domains featured GIFs of Megan Fox and Sydney Sweeney removing their clothes, and claimed that users could upload a photo to generate a "naughty AI video." The domains' source codes included instructions directing search engines not to index them. Redactions added by Graphika.

- **Using non-explicit messages and images:** Instead of using explicit terms about their ability to "undress" or remove a subject's clothes, the ads we observed tended to rely on implicit terms and imagery that alluded to this ability.
    - For example, ads commonly used phrasing suggesting that users could create "spicy," "stunning," "sultry," or "naughty" videos, bring their images "to life," or upload a photo of "anyone and generate them doing anything."
    - This text ran alongside images, almost always of women, that were overlaid with emojis, black boxes, blurriness, or other editing techniques to indicate censorship or "sensitive content." Some ads included videos that implied sexual content or briefly depicted the promoted service.
    - Meta also noted this evasion tactic in its March 2026 Adversarial Threat Report.
- **Using AI-generated, stock, or stolen profile images:** Actors behind social media accounts that are inauthentic, perpetuating scams, or hiding a malicious intent often use AI-generated, stock, or stolen images to fill out profiles.
    - In one case, we identified an extensive network of coordinated Facebook pages that ran ads for four NCII services, which suggests that the page network may not be connected to a specific service but is a for-hire operation. We connected these pages based on several indicators, including the inclusion of the same phone number in their bios and many using the same stock image as a profile picture.
    - In some instances, pages that ran ads for NCII services used the logos of the service they were promoting as a profile or banner image.

- **Initially using two- or three-part names:** The pages we observed commonly used first-name last-name or first-, middle-, last-name combinations. Examples included pages with the names Jon Gibson or Kennie Kacz Danielle, which Meta has removed.
    - Some pages subsequently changed their names, but the original two- or three-part name was visible via Meta's Page Transparency tool.
    - Indicator has identified this same technique in its reporting.
- **Little to no timeline activity:** The pages we identified had little to no activity on their timelines, an indication that the pages were established and designed to run ads rather than seek engagement. This is also a common indicator of inauthentic social media accounts.



Examples of Facebook pages that ran ads for the same NCII service, used GAN-generated profile images, and had three-part names. The pages are now inaccessible



An example of a now-removed Facebook page that was part of a network and used a stock image of three women shopping (top). Other pages in the network that used the same image ran ads for NCII services (bottom). The ads listed different domains that directed to the same NCII service. Redactions added by Graphika.

X

Since April 2025, a large network of very likely automated or inauthentic accounts on X has continually promoted a prominent AI nudifier service. Indicator and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue published reports in June 2025 and October 2025, respectively, that referenced this network, which remains operational.

In total, the network consists of about 45,000 unique accounts that posted more than 74,000 times between April 1, 2025, and Feb. 28, 2026, according to Brandwatch data.

The network published dozens to hundreds of posts a day promoting the service with posts that consistently use one of 16 identical formats and are variations of the same theme:

- The posts open with statements suggesting the poster has seen an impressively advanced AI tool that is "insane," "the wildest thing" on the internet, or symbolic of "peak internet craziness."
- They use specific terminology to highlight that the service can "undress" people in photos, including "deepnude" or "nudify," and state that other users have to try it.
- They link to the service's URL and end with a different set of three hashtags that also use terminology related to AI undressing and nudifier services, such as "#NSFWGenerator #undressher #DeepfakeNSFW."

To further examine the network's characteristics, we reviewed the 10 accounts that had the highest post volume between Feb. 22 and 28, 2026. We found the following:

- Five of the 10 followed and reposted content from the service's X account, which itself has about 90k followers.
- The accounts posted the promotional messages repeatedly during the seven-day period, sometimes multiple times a day. Their posts had little to no engagement.
- The accounts were bare-bones, typically having no or single-digit followers and followings, blank or generic profile images, no bios, and automatically generated usernames that combined their handles with random numbers.

X posts from the network that used versions of identical text to promote an NCII service. Redactions added by Graphika.



This graph shows the number of monthly X posts between April 1, 2025, and Feb. 28, 2026, that used one of the 16 post formats. The network did not start posting before April 11, 2025. Source: Brandwatch.

Grok

While examining the network on X, we observed instances of Grok promoting and linking to the same prominent service and other AI nudifiers in response to user requests. This behavior appears to be a continuation and adaptation of X users leveraging Grok to undress photos of women, which received significant media and regulatory attention in late 2025 and early 2026.

In the posts we observed, X users responded to images of women who were naked or wearing limited clothing – some of which Grok created at the request of other users – and asked Grok questions about which app produced the altered image or which app was best at doing so. Grok's answers then mentioned specific services and linked to their websites, providing another avenue of promotion and ease of access to these sites.

We could not determine whether the users who questioned Grok were intentionally attempting to promote specific NCII services or if they were trying to identify tools to generate additional images.



Additional examples of exchanges X users had with Grok requesting recommendations for NCII services. In the exchange on the right, a user responded to a U.K. government account's announcement about laws banning NCII services and used it to ask Grok for potentially affected websites. Redactions added by Graphika.



Exchanges X users had with Grok requesting recommendations for NCII services. Redactions added by Graphika.

PDF Injection and SEO Poisoning

In our prior reporting, we found that NCII affiliate marketers regularly engaged in comment and referral link spamming by replying in large quantities to social media posts that mentioned NCII-associated keywords with their referral links.

In late 2025 and February 2026, we identified instances of NCII affiliate marketers using multiple means to drive engagement toward their referral links by exploiting how search engines index the web. These techniques involved forms of search engine optimization (SEO) spam or poisoning, the injection of spam PDFs onto government and university websites, and leveraging an AI platform's chat share function to produce "ready to rank" documents that promoted and linked to NCII services that were then indexed by search engines and publicly findable. These same methods were also used to promote several AI companion or adult entertainment websites that provide ways to create explicit content, but not necessarily NCII.

PDF Injection

Between August and October 2025, we observed Google search results returning links to PDFs that promoted NCII and AI companion or adult entertainment websites. The PDFs were embedded on dozens of university and government websites, including the websites for Harvard

Business School, Australia's University of Wollongong, and state agencies in California, Louisiana, New York, and Pennsylvania, among others. These websites were very likely targeted because they use .edu or .gov domains that appear as trustworthy, authoritative, and high-quality sources for search engines.

The PDFs followed near-identical formats, including the repeated use of key terms related to NCII generation, like "Undress AI," "Deepnude AI," or "clothing removal." They also contained "try" buttons that redirected to the promoted services. Independent researcher Brian Penny also identified this technique, finding that it extended to PDFs with spammy cryptocurrency content or promoting other products. 404 Media and several local news outlets reported on Penny's findings in December 2025.

Blackbox.ai

Between Feb. 18 and March 18, 2026, we identified 54 publicly viewable chats hosted on the AI platform Blackbox.ai that promoted a prominent NCII service and several AI companion or adult entertainment websites.

These chats contained similar or nearly identical prompts that directed the AI platform to produce articles that were "SEO friendly," "ready to rank on Google," and contained call-to-action buttons to the promoted services. Based on timestamps in the chats' source codes, the chats were all created between Oct. 23, 2025, and March 18, 2026. Several were created in batches on the same day, including within about 10 minutes of each other. Twenty-two of them promoted the same NCII service discussed in the X section above, including with prompts requesting Blackbox.ai generate articles discussing "teen safety" or the legality of the NCII service, even while the resulting articles contained links directly to the service.

More than 80% (44) of the chats included links to the same profile on the "link in bio" platform Beacons.ai, which had promotional links for four AI companion or adult entertainment websites. This suggests that the same actor(s) repeatedly used this technique to generate promotional materials.

We could not assess whether the actor(s) who created the chats on Blackbox.ai intended for the chats to be public or if this was an unintentional result of them using the platform's share function, similar to instances in 2025 where users' chats with ChatGPT and Grok were indexed and made public. However, the quantity of the chats identified and their batch creation indicate that the actor(s) found the platform to be a viable way of mass-creating these promotional materials.





Examples of prompts and the beginning sections of the resulting articles on Blackbox.ai that promoted an NCII service. Redactions added by Graphika.





Google search results for publicly viewable chats on Blackbox.ai that promoted various AI companion or adult entertainment services (top) and an AI undressing service (bottom). While we did not test the promoted services, the chats shown in the top image did not explicitly promote NCII services, even though they used key NCII-related terms like "nudify" or "deepnude," likely for SEO reasons.

Promo Codes and 'Mods'

In February and March 2026, we identified 25 YouTube channels that had published videos suggesting users could access "Undress AI" discount codes or that presented tutorials for downloading modified apps onto iOS and Android devices.

The videos promoting discount codes directed users to visit websites that offer coupons for various companies and online services. We surfaced entries for alleged discount codes for NCII services on several of these websites. Clicking on the discount offer often went directly to the promoted service. Several of the prompts used to create promotional articles via Blackbox.ai discussed above instructed the AI model to include language about discount or "promo" codes, suggesting that this technique extends beyond the identified YouTube videos.



The thumbnail image for a YouTube video that claimed users could access discount codes for an NCII service on websites that offer digital coupons.

The tutorial videos suggested users could download an "Undress AI" app to mobile devices through websites that claim to offer modified mobile apps and "game tweaks" to access apps for free and avoid ads. We did not test these methods. The channels that published these videos also published videos with tutorials for downloading non-NCII apps, such as games or AI models. Based on open-source information, we could not definitively conclude if the actor(s) behind the

YouTube channels were affiliated with NCII services, the websites that offered modified apps, or were acting independently.





Screenshots from YouTube videos that provided tutorials for allegedly downloading an NCII app to mobile devices. The videos were posted on separate channels, but featured the same male individual, suggesting that the same person operates the channels. Redactions added by Graphika.

Estimative Language Legend

Assessments of Likelihood

Graphika uses the following vocabulary to indicate the likelihood of a hypothesis proving correct. If we are unable to assess likelihood due to limited or non-existent information, we may use terms such as "suggest."

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Real Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(ly)
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

Confidence Levels: Indicators of Sourcing and Corroboration

Graphika uses confidence levels to indicate the quality of information, sources, and corroboration underpinning our assessments.

Low Confidence	Medium Confidence	High Confidence
Assessment based on information from a non-trusted source and/or information we have not been able to independently corroborate.	Assessment based on information that we are unable to sufficiently corroborate and/or information open to multiple interpretations.	Assessment based on information from multiple trusted sources that we are able to fully corroborate.

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