## IRA in Ghana: Double Deceit

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The Graphika Team

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#### **Information Operations**

## IRA in Ghana: Double Deceit

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#### **Executive Summary**

On March 12, 2020, CNN, Twitter, <u>Facebook</u>, Graphika, and two professors from Clemson University<sup>1</sup> exposed a cross-platform influence operation on social media that was run from Ghana but targeted Black communities in the United States. These organizations assessed that the operation, which was still in the early stages of building its audience, was linked to a Ghanaian NGO ostensibly focused on human rights, but ultimately traceable to Russia. Facebook attributed the operation to "individuals associated with past activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA)."

Partners involved in the discovery and assessment of this campaign shared the pages and accounts they had found with Graphika. In parallel, CNN investigated on the ground in Ghana and interviewed members of the NGO, some of whom appeared not to have realized that they were working for a foreign influence operation. The operation's managers appear to have tried to deceive their own staff as well as American internet users; for that reason, we have dubbed this operation "Double Deceit."

The operation began around June 2019. It featured accounts across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, some of them apparently authentic personal accounts belonging to the NGO's employees; other pages claimed to be of nonexistent organizations or generic issue-focused accounts. The posts on these accounts combined positive and uplifting messages on issues such as black pride, beauty, and heritage with political posts about racism, oppression, and police violence against the black community in the United States. The operation did not systematically comment on the 2020 US presidential election: posts targeting candidates and campaigns seldom appear in this set.

The operation did not create much original content; instead, it primarily borrowed content from elsewhere online, especially memes that were already popular online. Operators appeared to have had access to a shared stock of memes and images that they used repeatedly across different accounts; some of those memes matched posts made by the original IRA in 2016-2017. They

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Darren Linvill and Patrick Warren deserve great credit for their long and attentive examination of the IRA's previous campaigns, which led them to identify suspicious networked activity, providing the first link in the investigative chain. We are grateful for both their academic and investigative contributions on this topic.



posted those against popular hashtags, notably #blackhistorymonth, which they used consistently from July through March (Black History Month is in February).

The operation focused strongly on using positive images of women to create an online following for these accounts. Many of the accounts dealt with black women's beauty; many posts featured children, especially girls. The main political themes woven throughout these posts touch upon racism and police violence in the United States. LGBTQ+ rights issues and accounts also featured regularly throughout this set, with a number of accounts solely dedicated to this theme.

Overall, the operation did not have a large following online. Facebook estimated that the 69 pages on its platform had just 13,500 followers. The 85 Instagram accounts performed better, with some 265,000 followers combined.<sup>2</sup> On Twitter, the 71 accounts identified by the platform as part of this operation totaled just under 68,500 followers.

Individual posts, however, did perform well: a handful of uplifting and positive posts went viral, gathering tens of thousands of likes and shares. These posts were not rooted in divisive or political themes but showed the operators' ability to identify and repost viral content and thus to reach a significant audience.

This operation highlights a few important lessons regarding the evolution of foreign influence campaigns.

The operation used authentic activists and users, fronted by an ostensible human rights NGO, to covertly propagate an influence campaign. It is not the first time such an attempt has been made, but the tactic is of concern. The unwitting individuals co-opted into the operation bear the risk of reputational or legal jeopardy; indeed, CNN reported that the Ghanaian operation was raided by law enforcement as a result of their online activities. For the human rights community, the risk is that genuine NGOs may be misidentified as being involved in influence operations by accident or malice, and there is also the danger of tarnishing the reputation of important work and organizations across the field.

Second, the use of apparently unwitting employees changes the operation's investigative profile. The resulting accounts were not the traditional "fake profiles" of personas, with made-up names and stolen faces: this further complicated the discovery process. On the other hand, account operators often left geographic indicators on their posts: while posting about the US, they would at times geo-localize in the suburbs of Accra, and many of the pages were visibly being managed in Ghana. The operation was deceptive, but not in the way more usually associated with troll operations. This is an area where further research and investigation would be valuable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Follower numbers are not a sound metric to assess an operation's influence on their own, but it is instructive to compare the combined totals outlined above with the IRA's most followed Instagram account in 2016. This was @sincerely\_black\_, which had 198,000 followers.



Third, the operation confirms the evolving targeting of the United States in general, and the black community in particular,<sup>3</sup> by people associated with the IRA. Although the themes and some of the content remained the same, Operation Double Deceit's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were notably different from those we documented in 2016.<sup>4</sup> Responding to information operations requires careful examination of historical patterns, combined with a focus on the latest TTPs appearing throughout newly exposed campaigns.

Finally, Double Deceit's exposure shows how far the operational research community has evolved since 2016. Researchers at Clemson University and Facebook's investigators identified the operation in parallel but complementary ways; CNN investigated on the ground. Both Facebook and Twitter worked with the research community to assess the scale of the operation. This degree of cooperation and co-investigation is a positive evolution and would not have been possible in 2016.

While information operations on social media have evolved, so have our collective defense capabilities. As major events, including the US 2020 presidential election and the coronavirus pandemic, continue to generate opportunities to sow discord and disinformation, it will be important to further strengthen cooperation within the operational research community to create the best outcomes for exposing influence operations before they can become viral themselves.

#### Background

On March 12, 2020, <u>Facebook</u> and Twitter announced that they had suspended accounts and pages linked to an influence operation that originated in Ghana but was linked to people associated with the Russian IRA. Simultaneously, and acting on a tip-off from researchers at Clemson University, CNN reported on its own months-long investigation, including interviews with some of the individuals involved.

Twitter said, "The accounts – operating out of Ghana and Nigeria and which we can reliably associate with Russia – attempted to sow discord by engaging in conversations about social issues, like race and civil rights. This activity did not exclusively favor any one candidate or any one ideological position."

Facebook said the operation "was operated by local nationals – some wittingly and some unwittingly – in Ghana and Nigeria on behalf of individuals in Russia." They used real and fake accounts to manage pages "posing as non-government organizations or personal blogs. (...)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For context of Russian active measures targeting American racial tensions and black activists, see Thomas Rid's upcoming book: "Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare," Farrar, Straus and Giroux (April 21, 2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Graphika's previous report for the US Senate Select Intelligence Committee, co-authored with colleagues at the Oxford Internet Institute:

https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/IRA-Report-2018.pdf.



Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their purpose and coordination, our investigation found links to EBLA, an NGO in Ghana, and individuals associated with past activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA)."

In its attribution, Facebook said that the network "was linked to the activity we had previously removed and attributed to the IRA in April 2018, July 2018 and November 2018." In <u>April 2018</u>, Facebook took down an IRA operation that mainly targeted Ukraine. In <u>July 2018</u>, the platform took down an <u>IRA operation</u> that targeted a <u>range of communities</u> in the United States, including Black Americans, Native Americans, and feminists. In <u>November 2018</u>, following a tip-off from US law enforcement, Facebook and Twitter took down IRA accounts that targeted the midterm elections and <u>posed</u> as racial, political, or social groups, from Black Americans and LGBTQ groups to gun-rights groups and southern conservatives.

This linkage places Double Deceit firmly in the genealogy of IRA operations.<sup>5</sup> The way it used real and apparently unwitting individuals from Ghana also resembles earlier Russian influence operations. The IRA in 2016-2017 <u>recruited</u> real, unwitting Americans to help organize election rallies. In October 2019, Facebook exposed an <u>Africa-based operation</u> attributed to associates of Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the funder of the IRA, that <u>hired local nationals</u> to post some of its content. A <u>Stanford Internet Observatory white paper</u> analyzed this activity in the Central African Republic, Libya, and Sudan, among others.

As such, Double Deceit represents an evolution, rather than a revolution, in activity by an actor marked by its persistence. According to CNN, after Twitter took down the operation's accounts at the end of February 2020, the Russia-based individual behind Double Deceit told his employees to create new accounts and keep on posting. The research and investigative community will continue monitoring for further activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> We are updating the Information Operations Archive's website with the archival data of these operations to allow and encourage the study of their evolution: www.io-archive.org



## The Operation

#### The Assets

Operation Double Deceit primarily leveraged accounts and pages on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram and used its posts to attract user engagement on the platforms themselves. Although the ostensible Ghanaian NGO at the center of the operation did maintain a website in its name, the social media operators did not try to drive users toward it. This approach is reminiscent of most of the IRA's previous operations<sup>6</sup> and distinct from many other known information operations from countries such as <u>Russia</u>, <u>Iran</u>, and the <u>Gulf States</u>, which used social media to drive users toward off-platform assets.

The operation's assets to date and at the time of the enforcement actions by the platforms included:

- 71 Twitter accounts collectively producing 42,475 tweets
- 49 Facebook accounts
- 69 Facebook pages
- 85 Instagram accounts

Some of the accounts appeared to belong to authentic individuals, who were contracted to post on behalf of the apparent NGO at the center of the operation. Others were purpose created and posed as different NGOs or activist accounts focused primarily on race issues and LGBTQ rights; these were created in or after June 2019, with a burst of account creation in July 2019. The "NGO" itself, "Eliminating Barriers to the Liberation of Africa" or EBLA, claimed to have been founded in June 2019, giving the operation an observable start date of June/July 2019.

A range of indicators showed that the assets were run from Ghana, including phone numbers, location tags on posts, and Facebook page transparency details. Since at least some of the operators appear to have unwittingly participated in this activity, this report does not identify any real individuals associated with the operation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A notable exception was the IRA's "Black Matters US" outlet: operators primarily used Twitter and Google Ads to drive traffic toward the website after the initial Facebook page was suspended.

Page Transparency for Strong Afric ×			
Summary Page History People Who Manage This Page Organizations That Manage This Page			
People Who Manage This Page It's common for a Page to be managed by many people from different places. You can check for a mismatch between a Page's purpose and the location of the people who manage it.			
O Primary country location of people who manage this Page includes:			
Ghana (2)			
Find Support or Report Page Close			
Page Transparency for Black People Trendz ×			
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Find Support or Report Page Close			
Page Transparency for Black People Trendz ×			
Summary Page History People Who Manage This Page Organizations That Manage This Page			
Page History Name changes can help you see if the Page's purpose has changed over time. If Page merges have occurred, that means that the Page has combined its followers with another Page.			
(2) Changed name to Black People Trendz July 25, 2019			
따 Page created - Black Affairs July 9, 2019			

Page Transparency for "Strong Afric" and "Black People Trendz," formerly "Black Affairs," showing the manager locations. Both pages were created on July 9, 2019, claimed to be NGOs, and largely posted about American issues. Name changes were a feature of this operation, as we shall see.




Geotag of a post from @blacks\_truth, an account that chiefly posted about the United States. This set contained multiple instances of posts geo-tagged in Accra, or in the suburbs of Accra.

This created an observable difference between the accounts' given location and the locations about which they focused. The operation's assets posted about American news and issues, especially black empowerment and police violence, far more than about Ghanaian or African issues. They also attempted to engage directly with American audiences.



Instagram post from @infinityfemme (previously @blacks\_news) designed to engage US audiences.



Sample posts by Strong Afric, focused on local incidents in the United States, including a Fox6Now <u>alert</u> for a missing man in Wisconsin.





Sample posts by Black People Trendz on racism and police brutality in the United States. The right-hand post is from an NBC News <u>report</u>.

Despite the ostensible NGO's mission statement valuing tolerance and inclusion, some of its posts adopted a more volatile tone, such as approving of, or advocating for, physical violence. One post even called for a Kentucky state senator to be "taken out" for sponsoring a bill that would <u>reportedly</u> give the police broader powers to stop and question people, based on suspicion of criminal activity. Others called for violence against minors.




Left to right, posts by operation assets "Roots Revival," @one\_world\_dawili, and Strong Afric justifying or calling for violence and punishment and for the Kentucky state senator to be "taken out."



The operators left open a number of routes for direct engagement with genuine users. Many of their posts explicitly asked for follows; some accounts provided phone numbers (with country codes in Ghana and Nigeria) and emails (which often looked like personal Gmail addresses).

Neither Facebook nor Twitter provided any insights into whether the operators engaged users through direct messages, but the Facebook accounts were visibly active through this channel: Blacks\_eye, for example, apparently replied to messages online within a day.




Messenger page for Blacks\_eye, showing the green button indicating it was online when the screenshot was taken in early March, and the typical reply time.

The Double Deceit operation was only nine months old when it was suspended. Most of its posts still appeared aimed at building and consolidating an audience for their pages. That attempt had mixed results. Facebook said that the operation's 49 public pages amassed around 13,500 followers; the Instagram accounts amassed 235,000 followers, roughly two-thirds of whom were in the United States. The 71 Twitter accounts gained a little over 68,000 followers. This was not a massive, viral operation, but it sought to create a solid base for further growth.

Graphika also examined the archived activity of a set of suspended Twitter accounts that were related to the same operation. Some of these accounts had usernames unique to Twitter, but others, such as @ebla\_network and @beautyofblacks, appeared to be the Twitter equivalents of assets on other platforms.

There were a total of 71 accounts, with 61 posting at least once (some appear to have been dormant). Although the earliest traces of activity go as far back as April 2014, systematic activity began in June 2019, a timeline consistent with the indicators on other platforms.



Timeline of tweets by the operation's 71 assets. Posts before June 2019 appear to reflect activity by the individuals who later came to work for the operation.

Activity levels on Twitter were fairly consistent as the operation ramped up, but none of the accounts was hyperactive. For instance, just 13 accounts posted more than 1,000 times over the period; the most active account in the set (@blackpride\_\_\_\_) authored only 8,100 posts. Further, just over 40% of the total posts were retweets, suggesting some effort was made either to author original content or to copy-paste it from elsewhere. Other accounts in the operation also frequently amplified these original posts.

On Twitter, the accounts engaged primarily with a handful of hashtags that mirror the activity this operation had on other platforms. #BlackLivesMatter was the most used by a considerable margin; #racism and #policebrutality posts were interspersed with others on #blackexcellence and #blackhistorymonth.

Hashtag	Number of Tweets	Number of Accounts
BlackLivesMatter	1,396	42
BlackLove	604	39
Africa	270	35
BlackExcellence	343	33
blackexcellence	446	33
PoliceBrutality	833	32
love	370	32
BlackHistoryMonth	489	32
racism	1,239	31
MondayMotivation	222	30
black	218	29
blacklivesmatter	693	29

The most common hashtags used on Twitter.

#### **Ghanaian Content**

A handful of the operation's content was in line with its Ghanaian location: a few posts talked about Ghana's politics, social life, and history, its tourist attractions, and its relationship with other African states. These constituted only a small fraction of the overall traffic; for example, the Instagram account @ssei\_world\_ posted about Ghana once, over a lifespan of 557 posts. The sharing was too sporadic to act as effective camouflage; it is more likely to reflect the operators' own interests and their perception that they were working for a genuine human rights NGO.



Posts by @ssei\_world\_ (left) and @b\_trends (right) on Ghana's neighborhood and its tourist attractions.




Posts by operation Instagram account @women.empowerment.ghana and Facebook account "Queer World" on Ghana.





Post by operation Instagram account @roots\_are\_deep, formerly @black\_is\_able, about Ghana. The name change appears to have been an attempt at disguise after CNN and the social platforms started investigating.



Content shared by Strong Afric from local Ghana website <u>ghanaweb.com</u> describing a female student's escape from "racially motivated rape" in China. The link directs to the mobile version of the article, suggesting the operator posted it from a mobile device.

#### Able was I, ere I saw EBLA

The ostensible NGO at the core of this network is called EBLA, Eliminating Barriers to the Liberation of Africa. According to the group's <u>website</u>, EBLA "employs the cyber activism approach - a mechanism where advocacy is done through the usage of the New Media (NM), to create awareness of human right issues in Africa and beyond via the sharing of stories or news on daily human right abuses. EBLA owns more than twenty accounts on each Social Media platform (Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram)." The group claimed to have been set up in June 2019. Its first Instagram post came on September 2, 2019; its <u>website</u>, Twitter account, and Facebook page were set up in October.

Facebook identified EBLA as the key organization behind this campaign; CNN, investigating on the ground, reported from the organization's headquarters in Ghana and interviewed one of its employees, who confirmed that they were given instructions on what to post on social media and advised to post in the late afternoon and at night. Ghana is on Greenwich Mean Time, five hours ahead of the US East Coast; afternoon and evening posting would thus fall in the daytime across the United States.

When information operations are accused of impersonating human rights NGOs, it is especially important to evaluate these claims with the highest standards of rigor and to give the organization every possible benefit of the doubt, to avoid the silencing of genuine (and often already threatened) voices.


According to the EBLA <u>website</u> and Facebook and Instagram accounts, the group had real employees and conducted one on-the-ground charitable action, distributing stationery with the EBLA logo to schoolchildren in Ghana. It was not, therefore, entirely a work of digital deception.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> To evaluate the different "types" of proxy organizations involved in information operations, Graphika uses two core dimensions: the organization's awareness that it is participating in a deceptive campaign and the amount of activity unrelated to the deceptive campaign that the organizations also participates in.



Detail of a post on the EBLA Facebook page, showing the branded merchandise.


However, the website also revealed traces consistent with deceptive activity. EBLA claimed to be "funded by members and individuals like you," and the website featured prominent buttons inviting users to donate. However, the wide-ranging list of projects it boasted - including building schools and providing food and water - was largely populated with stock Latin texts, and all its "donate" buttons were in test mode, meaning that it was impossible to offer an actual donation. One of the projects claimed to have raised \$231.52 billion - over three times <u>Ghana's annual GDP</u>.



The EBLA "donations" page. Note the stock Latin text "Lorem ipsum," the crossover between the first and third projects ("Build school for poor children" and "School for Poor Children"), and the 200 billion dollar raise.



Several of the "project" headlines appeared to replicate one another ("Build school for poor children" and "school for poor children"; "Water for all children" and "Clean water for kids"). The identical project headlines, with the identical Latin tags underneath, appeared on a number of other apparent charity websites; two even featured the identical images, language, and implausible sums raised.




Donations pages for <u>gambiaparticipate.org</u> (left) and <u>collectiftubakunde.org</u> (right). Note the image and text matches and the total sums listed.

The website also listed news articles that were inconsistent with EBLA's description of its creation in June 2019. The "Latest News" section featured four articles: one description of the school visit mentioned above, and three stories from the first half of 2017. A Google search for the relevant texts showed that they appeared verbatim on a number of other apparent charity websites, including those which also featured matching imagery.



"Latest News" section from the footer of the EBLA website, showing the articles dated to April and May 2017.

EBLA's social media content was coordinated, working across multiple platforms to share the same content to multiple audiences, for example, sharing screenshots of tweets and advertising its Instagram account on its Facebook page.



Three posts from the EBLA Facebook page, all focused on race issues and tensions in the United States. The left-hand post is a video share, the center post shares an EBLA tweet, and the right-hand post appears copied from the EBLA Instagram account, since it urges users to "follow @ebla\_network." This was the handle of the Instagram account; the Facebook handle was @EBLA.GHANA.AFRICA.


The content was split between a number of topics. Of 44 posts between October 1, 2019, when the Facebook account was created, and February 5, 2020, the date of its last post, eight dealt with events in Africa. Twelve dealt with racism, racial injustice, or race-based violence in the United States. Four dealt with women's rights, and eight were broader calls for tolerance.



Tolerance-themed posts from the EBLA Facebook page.

This is broadly in line with EBLA's self-declared mission to "create awareness of human right (sic) issues in Africa and beyond" but with a definite emphasis on "beyond," specifically the United States, rather than Africa. However, it is also consistent with the early stages of a covert information operation trying to build an audience among Black American communities through a mixture of positive and negative posting.

Two other posts are of particular interest. Published in October, these advertised for EBLA staff "with experience in Social Media management" in Nigeria; one of the two received over 3,000 likes. In January 2020, EBLA advertised on LinkedIn for a "Chapter Coordinator" in Charleston, South Carolina. The LinkedIn ad urged potential American applicants to "join hands with our brothers and sisters world-wide, especially in the United States where POC are mostly subjected to all forms of Brutality." There is no indication that either ad directly led to a hire, but it shows a clear interest in establishing a presence on the ground in the United States. The choice of Charleston is noteworthy, as it was the site of <u>a protest</u> that the IRA-attributed Black Matters US group assisted in organizing via their @rallycharleston account, as well as <u>running ads</u> immediately following the white nationalism inspired 2015 mass shooting at Emanuel AME church.



EBLA job ads for Nigeria and the United States.

It is unclear how much EBLA's staff knew about the purpose of the operation and the individuals associated with it. According to CNN, EBLA's manager presented himself to them under a false name and told the organization's staff that their job was online activism; an EBLA staff member interviewed by CNN said they had "no idea" they would be working as a Russian troll. Facebook said the operation involved "witting and unwitting" users. The vast majority of the operation's posts did not deal directly with the US election but focused on civil and human rights, with a particular focus on the black community in America. It is therefore likely that at least some of the keyboard operators were deceived as to the purpose of their activity, even while that purpose was to deceive American users as to the origins of the content.

For this reason, Graphika has nicknamed this IRA-associated operation Double Deceit.

## The Content

Operation Double Deceit posted on a range of issues, but with a special focus on the Black American communities. It appeared to be in the early stages of audience building: it blended positive posts about African women's beauty and hair, African and Black American high achievers, the African heritage, history, and civil rights, sexual minorities, and broad human rights issues, with negative posts about racism and police violence in the United States.

There was no systematic mention of the US presidential election, nor was there a systematic focus on any candidate. When candidates were mentioned, the mentions concerned issues of human rights, tolerance, and racism, in line with the apparent focus of the Double Deceit assets.

A selection of content samples from across the operation focusing on beauty, black excellence, racism, and police violence is included at the end of this report. The following sections focus on the resemblance between Double Deceit and earlier IRA campaigns; the small amount of content




that dealt with the US elections; the operation's coordinated use of the same memes and visual style across multiple accounts; its attempts to hide; and its overall impact.

#### Copying IRACopyPasta?

Unlike the original Internet Research Agency operation that targeted the United States from 2014 to 2017, Double Deceit was run from Africa and used locals on the ground to make its posts. However, on occasion, it used memes based on the same images as the original IRA, creating a strong visual similarity between the operations.

Those memes were not unique to the IRA and may indicate no more than that the Ghanaian operators picked up the same popular and successful memes from elsewhere as the original IRA did, a case of parallel evolution rather than direct descent. However, given the attribution of this operation to individuals associated with past activity by the IRA, we include the resemblance here as an illustration of the continuity of theme between the two operations.

The memes included both positive, audience-building posts and negative content focused on racial tensions.



Left, memes posted by operation accounts @black\_love\_natural and @worlds\_eye. Right, meme posted by original IRA account @afrokingdom\_, preserved in the USHadrons <u>archive</u>.



Left, Facebook post by operation account "Black Tales." Right, post by original IRA account "Black Matters US," identified by the watermark, from the USHadrons <u>archive</u>.



Left, Instagram post by @revelation\_of\_excellence. Right, post by original IRA account Black Matters US, identified by the watermark, from the USHadrons <u>archive</u>.



Left, meme by "No need for racism," based on an image associating the police with violence, racism, and the Ku Klux Klan. Right, the same underlying image posted by original IRA account "Nefertiti Community," preserved in the USHadrons <u>archive</u>.


Another way the Ghana-based operation resembled earlier IRA activity was in its extensive use of language copied and pasted from genuine users. This was a particular feature of the IRA operation exposed in 2019 that Graphika has dubbed <u>IRACopyPasta</u>. In the case of CopyPasta, the copying appears to have been intended to embed the IRA campaign more firmly in its target audience by using language characteristic of that audience, and to have camouflaged the operation's foreign origins by hiding behind genuine native speech. In the case of Double Deceit, it appears designed to inflate the amount of content available for the least effort.

For example, the Facebook post on Malian king Mansa Musa illustrated above included a passage that was word-for-word identical with a bio published on the website <u>Biography Online</u> in January 2018. The same post also included an apparently original passage that was marked by non-standard English grammar: "you did be shocked it was an African."



Comparison of the Black Tales post and the Biography Online entry.

A post about a Ghanaian PhD student presenting to the UK House of Commons was copied from the online <u>Ghanaian American Journal</u>. The Instagram account @kofibrukua, which focused on LGBTQ issues, repeatedly shared verbatim texts and screenshots from outlets including LGBTQ Nation and pinknews.co.uk, without attributing them or providing links to the full text. This account was originally called @rainbow\_vvoice but changed its name in late February 2020 after Twitter suspended the operation's accounts on its platform.




Top, <u>article</u> by LGBTQ Nation. Bottom, verbatim copy of the article, without naming the source outlet or providing a link, posted by @kofibrukua.

The Facebook page Blacks\_eye repeatedly posted content from U.S.-based outlet the Atlanta Black Star, <u>self-described</u> as a "narrative company" whose aim is to publish "empowering narratives for all people of African descent and everyone who adheres to our culture". Blacks\_eye itself was one of the cluster of pages created on July 9, 2019 and overtly managed from Ghana.

Page Transparency for Blacks_eye	
Summary Page History People Who Manage This	Page
Page Transparency Summary Facebook is showing information to help you better underbook See actions taken by the people who manage and post cor	stand the purpose of a Page. Intent. Learn More
Page History	People Who Manage This Page
្រែ Page created July 9, 2019 - Blacks_eye	<ul> <li>Primary country location of people who manage this Page includes:</li> </ul>
() Page name has not changed	Ghana (2)
≫ Merged with 0 other Pages.	
See More	
Ads From This Page	
This Page is not currently running ads.	
	Go to Ad Library
Find Support or Report Page	Close

Page transparency feature for Blacks\_eye showing the manager location and creation date.

Each time the Facebook page posted Atlanta Black Star content, it used the t.co link shortener, which is Twitter's shortening service. On each occasion, the t.co link on the Blacks\_eye page matched the t.co link on the Atlanta Black Star Twitter account, indicating that Operation Double Deceit took its content direct from the Twitter feed, rather than, for example, the website.



Top and bottom, tweets from the Atlanta Black Star, showing the t.co short links. Center left and right, shares of the same stories by Blacks\_eye showing the same t.co links.



These techniques are innocent in themselves: many genuine social media users copy content without attribution and post from one platform to another. In this case, however, the technique allowed the operators in Ghana to access a ready stock of genuine content appropriate to the themse they associated themselves with, allowing them to build character and audience.

#### Little focus on electoral politics in the US

Very little of the operation's content referenced the 2020 US presidential election or its candidates directly, and those that did mention them did so in a way that was appropriate to their ostensible personas as human rights activists. For example, one of the operation's earlier posts, in August 2019, featured a clip from a Democratic debate in which Rep. Tulsi Gabbard called out Senator Kamala Harris for her record as a prosecutor.



Post by @heart\_of\_afric featuring the video of Tulsi Gabbard and Kamala Harris.

A post by LGBTQ-focused account @kofibrukua (formerly @rainbow\_vvoice) focused on Democratic candidate Tom Steyer and his stance on LGBTQ issues.





Post by @kofibrukua on Tom Steyer.

A number of posts criticized or mocked US President Donald Trump, notably pointing to his stance on race relations and LGBTQ rights. At least one post defended him, and other posts mentioned presidential candidates Senator Elizabeth Warren and Mayor Pete Buttigieg. Again, however, these were not pitched in the context of the election but of broader issues of race and gay rights.



Post on Buttigieg by operation asset @queerafrica1.





Post on Warren by operation asset @roots\_are\_deep, formerly @black\_is\_able.



Posts defending and attacking Trump by operation asset @one\_world\_dawili; the right-hand post features Senator Bernie Sanders calling Trump a "racist," a "xenophobe," and a "religious bigot."

The references to the election and to individual candidates formed a small minority of overall content and did not reveal a pattern of systematically attacking or defending one particular candidate. Operation Double Deceit appeared focused on building its audience in the target community; it did not appear to focus on the 2020 election in any systematic way.

#### Coordinated posting and shared content


Across platforms, the operation's assets functioned as a network, posting the same content, using the same visual style, and following and amplifying each other. Of the 71 accounts in the asset list provided by Twitter, 47 were mentioned or retweeted by at least one other account in the network.

In-network amplification (which accounted for just over 9,800 tweets in the total dataset) appears to have been coordinated to skew in favor of a small number of select accounts. The top three accounts received over half of all in-network retweets or mentions (~60%) and the top ten accounts received 84%, indicating the network favored heavily amplifying or boosting a few accounts to expand their reach. This behavior appears to have been done with little use of automation tools; 93% of total posts were made via Twitter for Android, in line with CNN's reporting that the employees were issued phones to use for the project.

Structural analysis of in-network interaction indicates that the engagement followed discernible patterns, based largely on common themes and focused around a few central accounts.

In the network graph on the following page, nodes represent in-network accounts and edges represent mentions or retweets between them. The large, purple cluster accounts for over 56% of the graph and represents accounts largely focused on police brutality and other content that can largely be classified as falling under the remit of the Black Lives Matter movement. Accounts within this cluster were primarily centered around @blackpride\_\_\_\_, @AfricaMustWake, @ElevateBlacks, and @BlackBarriers.

Accounts within the orange cluster mostly tweeted about LGBTQ+ issues; these accounts tended to amplify @EBLA\_NETWORK but also engaged in moderate levels of intra-cluster amplification, as evidenced by the star-like pattern in the graph visualization below. Similarly, accounts within the green cluster engaged in low levels of back and forth boosting; however, they too were largely centered around a single account: @Blac\_Impact. In terms of content, this cluster alternated between black-centric aspirational content, social injustice, and social media marketing.



Simple mentions graph of assets provided by Twitter; colors represent cluster affiliation.


Across social platforms, the operators repeatedly shared the same meme to different accounts or the same meme on the same account at different times.




The same meme posted by operation account @worlds\_eye on November 20, 2019 (left) and March 10, 2020 (right).



The same meme posted by operation account @worlds\_eye on November 20 and December 15, 2019. Note that both reference Black History Month, which is in February.



The same meme posted by operation accounts @worlds\_eye, @blackhair\_blackcrown, @news\_hubb and @ssei\_world\_ between October 2019 and March 2020.



The same meme posted by accounts @one\_world\_dawili, @roots\_are\_deep (formerly @black\_is\_able), @revelation\_of\_excellence (formerly @african\_pride\_\_\_), and @unityispowerforall (formerly @acomplishmentofblacks).

The network also had a uniform visual style, especially on Instagram. Here, a number of accounts used their Instagram highlights, which appear in circles at the top of the profile, to spell out words indicative of the accounts' thematic focus. This suggested a house style and a degree of creative coordination between the operators.



	blackbeautyguru Follow v ··· 124 posts 1,859 followers 192 following BLACK BEAUTY GURU™ <sup>®</sup> Beauty & Health Secrets for Black Women <sup>®</sup> #blackbeauty #melaninpoppin
B L B L	
	trendsworldwideFollow v ··· 36 posts 211 followers 25 following Top_Page Worlds best Page
T R IS	E N D THE BEST PAGE
	KOfibrukua       Follow       •         494 posts       1,323 followers       1,700 following         Bra Kofi       Understanding diversity and eliminating all forms of barriers in our world
L G	в

Profiles for operation accounts @blackbeautyguru, @trendsworldwide\_\_ , and @kofibrukua (formerly @rainbow\_vvoice).

All these factors indicate a coordinated operation working off a single playbook, a shared stock of content and a shared visual style.


#### Hide-and-seek

In late February, Twitter suspended the operation's assets on its platform, following tip-offs from CNN and researchers at Clemson University. In the wake of the suspension, the operation's Instagram accounts changed their names *en masse* in what can only have been a coordinated attempt to hide.

However, their earlier practice of urging users to follow them in many of their posts meant that they left behind clear traces, allowing researchers to reconstitute their activity. Many of those



moments are noted above; in the illustration below, the account @blacksbhae was originally called @Perfect\_Africano, as shown by its posts and bio.




Post and bio of @blacksbhae, showing the shoutouts to its earlier name.

The late account most recently called @\_mrsmagic led an even more adventurous existence. This account started out as @racists\_busted. At the end of February, it changed to @\_mrs\_magic, before changing again on March 11 to @\_mrsmagic. Facebook took it down on March 12. A similar fate led @blackness\_unleashed to change to @\_beautiful\_angels and then @\_beautifulangels.





From busting racists to Mrs Magic: the name changes of one account.



From @blackness\_unleashed to @\_beautifulangels.



These were not particularly sophisticated attempts at concealment, since they left a visible record in the posting history, nor do they represent the "new" accounts that, according to CNN, the operation's manager advised his operators to create.

#### Virality and audience

Operation Double Deceit seemed to have had mixed success at consolidating an online following for its accounts and entities across platforms. As noted earlier, the Facebook pages gathered a combined following of only some 13,500 accounts, and their posts did not generally achieve viral attention.

On Twitter, the operation as a whole gained modest attention, with a little over 68,000 followers. For context, this is half the following amassed by one IRA account from the original 2016 campaign, <u>@TEN\_GOP</u>.

The Twitter accounts appeared to loosely divide their functions between content creators and content amplifiers. The majority of accounts never gained more than 10 retweets for any single posts, but other users in the set achieved some mild traction. The most successful post, authored by @TheNewAfrica\_, gained 6,437 retweets and 10,314 likes and read "Hector Pino invented FreshWater, a machine that can pull moisture out of the air, filter it and turn it into pure drinking water with the press of a button. Lets (sic) celebrate our own, RT of (sic) you are proud to be black." This underscores how positive, affirmative content tended to generate the operation's largest impact.

The Twitter operation certainly tried to reach genuine influencers. Accounts within the network tended to target or amplify external accounts in much the same way they engaged in-network assets, with a select few accounts receiving most of the engagement.


Operation Double Deceit tended to amplify or reach out to mainstream media outlets - like CNN, Now This News, ABC, and Al Jazeera - as well as activists, influencers, and politicians, like @TariqNasheed, @BarackObama, and @\_SJPeace\_. Not surprisingly, the operation also tried to engage with accounts focused on issues related to racial, social, and economic justice; for example, @TheRoot, @ATLBlackStar, Huffington Post's @blackvoices, @Blklivesmatter, and @PinkNews were among some of the most mentioned and retweeted accounts.

The Twitter accounts for this operation also regularly retweeted accounts ostensibly operated by black Americans and social justice-oriented individuals with low to moderate follower counts. In most cases, one or two of the operation's assets would retweet a genuine account with 100-1,000 followers a handful of times. The frequency with which this occurred - the operation behaved this way toward almost 5,000 accounts - may indicate that accounts strategically engaged with black

Americans on Twitter in an effort to cultivate credibility and develop an audience within the community.

As a whole, however, the Twitter arm of the campaign appears to have struggled to reach the much larger engagement figures of the Instagram accounts.

Instagram was the operation's most effective platform in terms of followers and in terms of the impact of individual posts. As Facebook (which owns Instagram) announced, the operation's Instagram branch amassed over 265,000 followers. Individual posts achieved genuine virality: the most popular one scored over 125,000 likes, and others scored in the tens of thousands.



Post from @black\_girl\_blogg and the Twitter original.



Meme posted by @blacks\_trendz; the text traced back to a <u>Facebook</u> post from a genuine user.



Meme posted by @unityispowerforall and original <u>tweet</u> from @Moorinformation.



Meme from @unityispowerforall and the Twitter original.

These viral posts had two things in common. First, they focused on positive themes of black beauty and empowerment. Second, they were copied from online posts that had already received substantial online engagement, in the thousands or tens of thousands of reactions. This is similar to the CopyPasta campaign described above. Again, it marks Double Deceit as an exercise in audience building, at least at this stage.



Impact can be achieved in different ways. On several occasions, users on Pinterest who seemed to have no link with Operation Double Deceit pinned its content. This was content the operation had itself taken from online sources, showing that the operation managed to influence genuine users at least enough to get them to share its posts elsewhere. However, these were not posts that the operation had created, merely posts that it had borrowed from elsewhere. This illustrates the complexity of such operations, where an influence operation can take content from one unwitting source and pass it on to another.





Left, <u>tweet</u> by @pocasians on skin tone; the tweet scored 28 likes. Center, the tweet as a screenshot on the operation account @\_black\_women\_matter\_ (screen name "Sheritta Lawrence"), with almost 22,000 likes. Right, the Instagram post on Pinterest, shared by a user who shows no link to the operation.

# Appendix: Content Samples

### Beauty

### Women





### Children





### **Cancer Remission**



At 9 years old, I had a rare blood cancer. Now I've reclaimed control over my health and body through fitness. This is by far my proudest transformation! 
 #cancersucks





blackfashiontips • Follow

...

**Black Don't Crack** 

Father & Son 20 Years Later





### "Black excellence"

**Military & First Responders** 







### **Sports**



# Meet the 7-Year Old Smashing Records as the Fastest Boy in the Country





### Science, Technology, Engineering, & Math



#### **Black Engineer Develops** unityispowerforall • Follow ••• 745 Patented Solar Power Technology **Being Used By HBCUs** unityispowerforall SolGreen is the The first and only Black-owned and operated company to develop and 🛉 Share 1.15k 😏 Tweet 👂 Pin 🖂 Mail bring to market innovative clean technology solutions for communities internationally. Solar-powered workstations developed by Matthew N. Portis are already being used by several HBCUs across the Founded by inventor and engineer country including Bowie State University and the University Matthew N. Portis, the company has of the District of Columbia (UDC). His other clients include installed their Evoida Solar Power Workstations at several HBCUs Shell Oil Company and the City of Orlando Florida. including Bowie State University and UDC, and they have just recently installed their 80th workstation at Park of the Americas in the City of Orlando, Florida. 5% $\heartsuit$ $\square$ $\bigcirc$ V 132 likes JANUARY 31 Add a comment... Matthew N. Portis, founder of SolGreen news\_hubb • Follow Black surgeon successfully performed ••• the first ever transplant surgery to cure news\_hubb things they dont want the deafness. world to know@ we are successful in alot of things but it doesnt make it to the news 👤 👤 .!!follow @news\_hubb !! #instadaily . #instagood #blackexcellence #love #love 1w Kelebogile @MsKelebogile $\bigcirc \bigcirc$ $\nabla$ $\square$ 51 likes Professor Mashudu Tshifularo. Say his 7 DAYS AGO Bame! Add a comment...



Entrepreneurship



20-year-old Kennedy Ekezie has been honored by Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, for raising over \$2 million worth of grants to start a mentorship programme for young Africans all over the world.






### Racism in the US

### **Experience of Racism**











own life Dec. 3, 2018, in her family's home. A federal lawsuit filed Thursday, Jan. 17, 2020, by her family alleges that administrators and teachers at her elementary school failed to protect her from incessant bullying.




### **Anti-Racism Posts**







### Inter and Intra-Ethnic Tensions





Hispanic Immigrant Family Faces Hate Crime Charges For Taking Turns Torturing Black American Boy That Their Daughter Was Hiding In Her Closet



unityispowerforall • Follow

 unityispowerforall The way she said
 "They grabbed a rope to try and calm him down..." <sup>(b)</sup> <sup>(i)</sup> #TeamDL #wtf #Repost @thesavoyshow with
 @get\_repost

The parents of a 15-year-old California girl are facing hate crime charges after police say they kidnapped and assaulted a black american boy they found hiding in the daughter's bedroom closet.

San Bruno Police arrested the girl's stepfather, Wilfredo Amaya; mother Haydee Arguello; and biological father Luisandor Suarez after it's alleged that they physically abused the young man, who's African-American, and threatened to kill him, San Francisco's

# O O V 163 views AUGUST 28, 2019 Add a comment... Post

### Privilege and violence in the US

White Privilege

Dentist and his wife are SPARED jail after keeping their disabled, 14-year-old daughter locked in a CAGE for a month and denying her food and water

By Valerie Edwards For Dailymail.com and Associated Press 15:56 26 Feb 2020, updated 16:25 26 Feb 2020



🖸 🖮 conscious\_couture








This photo is a deeper reflection of the disparities between black and white Americans with regards to the judicial system and law enforcement. And its simply sickening 😦

...






**Police Brutality** 

### Police release video of officer handcuffing and arresting 6-yearold girl



unityispowerforall • Follow ••• unityispowerforall Video has finally 34 been released showing a traumatized and sobbing 6-year-old Black girl being handcuffed, arrested and taken to jail in Orlando, Florida, in Sept. 2019. The girl was also reportedly photographed and fingerprinted like a hardened criminal. This is so sad... !!Follow @unityispowerforall !! #blacksnews #melanin #blackpower #blackhistory #blackpeople #blacklove #blackexcellence #blacklivesmatter #blackgirlmagic #BlackGirlsRock #blackisbeautiful #blackpride  $\heartsuit \bigcirc \bigtriangledown$ 353 likes FEBRUARY 26 Add a comment...







### #BlackHistoryMonth



...



They were drilled through hell just in the name of equality. All sort of abusive words were used against them, some went to jail, molested and lost their lives through this fight for #equality. They can never be traced in the history books so we have to let them known. !! Follow @blackisking1.

. #blackhistorymonth #blackhistory #blackhistory365 #blackhistoryfacts #blacklivesmatter #love #photography #photooftheday

Let's celebrate the men & women who were bullied & sprayed & abused fighting for equality, but aren't in history books #BlackHistoryMonth



200

1 Share

•••



Born a slave in 1840 in North Carolina and moved to Texas at the age of 10 as a slave. Walter Moses Burton at 29 became the 1st black elected sheriff in the US. He later became State Senator in Texas. Burton also helped found Prairie View A&M University. #BlackHistoryMonth



Comment

🖒 Like

⇔ Share